RESTORED
O'Connor v. Donaldson
422 U.S. 563 (1975) · 1975
Fifteen years of confinement, no treatment, no danger to anyone. The Court said a diagnosis is not a reason to hold a person.
“A State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.”
The Ruling
9–0: A State cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom, alone or with willing help. Kenneth Donaldson had been held for roughly fifteen years.
The Personhood Argument Not Made
This is the mechanism running in reverse. Donaldson's confinement rested on a status — mentally ill — that had been allowed to substitute for any finding about him. The Court refused the substitution and required the state to say something about the actual person: is he dangerous, can he survive. Restoring personhood here meant nothing more than insisting the law look at an individual instead of a category.
The Execution Gap Created
The gap closes, and only partly. The constitutional principle is unanimous and clear, while the remedy in this case returned to the lower courts on the question of the superintendent's immunity. The rule against warehousing a harmless person is established; what it costs the institution that did it is left open.
Primary sources & research
Related cases
Part of The Personhood Prism, the companion to The Execution Gap by Thomas William Hornig. See all personhood cases →