CAGED
People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery
124 A.D.3d 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2014) · 2014
A chimpanzee was denied habeas corpus because he could not bear legal duties — a test the law has never applied to any human.
“Unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions.”
The Ruling
The New York Appellate Division, Third Department, unanimously held that Tommy, a chimpanzee held in a cage in Gloversville, NY, was not a 'person' entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. The court reasoned that personhood under the writ presupposes the capacity to bear legal duties and societal responsibilities — capacities the court found chimpanzees lack.
The Personhood Argument Not Made
Lavery introduces a duties-precondition theory of personhood: rights flow only to entities that can be held accountable. The doctrine is internally incoherent — infants, the comatose, the severely cognitively disabled, and corporations all enjoy legal personhood without bearing reciprocal duties in any meaningful sense. The selective application of the duties-test to the chimpanzee reveals it as a post-hoc rationalization for a pre-existing species line. Personhood here is not derived from criteria; the criteria are derived from a pre-existing personhood verdict.
The Execution Gap Created
Tommy died in captivity, his location at time of death disputed and his transfer history opaque. The legal frame that denied him personhood also denied his counsel the procedural tools needed to track him, visit him, or verify his welfare. The execution gap is total: not only is the formal right absent, but the absence of formal personhood blocks the ordinary investigative mechanisms by which an injury could be established and remedied.
Primary sources & research
Related cases
Part of The Personhood Prism, the companion to The Execution Gap by Thomas William Hornig. See all personhood cases →